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Neuropsychiatry in the Courtroom
by Richard L. Elliott*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Symposium, "The Brain Sciences in the Courtroom," will make
frequent reference to neuropsychiatry, neuroinaging, and brain science,
and assumes a rudimentary understanding of neuroscience. While some
readers have considerable experience in these areas, others might benefit
from a brief introduction to key concepts in neuroscience, and to their
applications in the courtroom from a historical perspective. In providing
such an introduction, several points will become clear. For 200 years,
lawyers, judges, and expert witnesses have struggled to understand how
neuroscience can be helpful in the courtroom, with varying degrees of
success. This is, in part, due to the fact that the brain is even more
complex than might be supposed, rendering any attempt to reduce
human emotion and behavior to a simple causal explanation, easily
comprehensible to decisionmakers, intractable. With this limitation, the
ultimate goal of this review is to provide a background to understand
some of the promises and limitations that forensic neuropsychiatry has
to offer. We begin by describing neuropsychiatry, presenting a brief
introduction to the organization in the brain, and reviewing several
historical cases illustrating problems applying neuropsychiatry in legal
settings.
II.

WHAT IS NEUROPSYCHIATRY?'

Neuropsychiatry can be defined as that branch of medicine concerning
mental disorders arising from the nervous system, emphasizing the
organic or physical causes and explanations for mental disorders, and
* Professor and Director of Medical Ethics, Mercer University School of Medicine;
Adjunct Professor, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. University of
Wisconsin (M.D., 1978; Ph. D., Biophysics 1979).
1. For a brief review, see WA Lishman, What is Neuropsychiatry?, 55 J. NEUROL.
NEUROSURG. & PSYCMATRY 983 (1992).
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using neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and neurochemistry as its basic
building blocks. Forensic neuropsychiatry is the application of this
knowledge in legal contexts.
Though neuropsychiatry is the prevailing model within psychiatry
today, historically, the dominant model in psychiatry has shifted
between biological and psychosocial models. Psychosocial models focus
on social, environmental, family, and interpersonal contributions to
mental disorders. Thus, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, moral (related to morale, such as psychosocial) treatments
advocated by Pinel and Tuke provided the framework for the humane
treatment of the mentally ill.2 From the middle of the nineteenth to the
early part of the twentieth centuries, many physicians concerned with
mental disorders were neurologists, and biological views were favored.
Recall that Freud was trained in neurology, and that his early works
described mental processes in hydraulic and mechanical terms, with
forces and pressures leading to symptom formation. Even though Freud
analyzed psychodynamic factors, he was careful to indicate that
physiological causes yet to be discovered probably contributed to an
individual's mental state.' The psychodynamic paradigm dominated
psychiatry in the early and middle twentieth century when most
psychiatrists were psychoanalytically trained and oriented. But in the
1970s, neuropsychiatry began to retake the field in training programs
due to a combination of factors, including the development of more
effective medications, disillusionment with the effectiveness of psychoanalysis, invention of intriguing tools with which to study the brain
(such as CT scans, MRIs, and radionuclide labeling of probes with which
to study binding to receptors), and the infusion of money from pharmaceutical companies into educational programs.
The term "neuropsychiatry" is often used as if it were synonymous
with psychiatry, but it is only one-albeit currently the dominant-model
with which psychiatrists approach the understanding of mental illness.
As this is the model under consideration, let us turn to a brief overview
of the building blocks for the neuropsychiatric model.

2. See EDWARD SHORTER, A HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE ERA OF ASYLUM TO THE
AGE OF PROZAC 19-22 (1997).
3. ERNEST JONES, THE LIFE AND WORK OF SIGMUND FREUD 133-45 (Lionel Trilling &

Steven Marcus eds., 1962).
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III. How is THE BRAIN ORGANIZED? 4
The human brain weighs approximately three pounds and is responsible for a variety of activities, such as perceptions, emotions, cognition,
and behaviors. As many of these occur simultaneously, the brain must
be organized in such a manner as to allow different activities to either
occur independently or in coordination, as the need arises. For example,
the reader of this Article is able to perceive the words on the page,
interpret their meaning, maintain body posture, attend to environmental
stimuli, and regulate bodily functions such as breathing, heart rate,
blood pressure, and temperature. To do all of this, the brain has evolved
an organization that segregates and integrates functions at gross
anatomic and microscopic neural levels.
At the gross anatomic level, the brain's outer, or cortical, portion is
divided into four lobes: frontal, parietal, temporal, and occipital. These
anatomic divisions may be appreciated from visual inspection of the
largest grooves-sulci-that separate them. Finding that neurophysiologic
specificity or localization is associated with these divisions is key to our
future discussion. Thus, temporal lobes are associated with-among
other things-input to language circuits; frontal lobes are associated with
planning, language output, and motor functions; parietal lobes are
associated with sensory localization; and the occipital lobe is associated
with vision. This is only a short list of localized functions, and
numerous other functions have been partly or wholly localized to specific
areas of the brain. Less well understood with respect to mental
processes are deeper brain structures such as the basal ganglia,
thalamus, hypothalamus, and cerebellum; these areas are essential to
regulating unconscious functions such as motor control, temperature,
appetite, and sleep, but current research indicates that these areas also
affect higher mental functions.
At the next, microscopic, level of brain structure are the one hundred
billion individual neurons in an adult brain, along with their connections. Each neuron has a zone for receiving inputs-dendrites-and has
axonal projections for sending outgoing signals. Connections with other
neurons are made though synapses, where one neuron releases
neurotransmitters, for example, serotonin or dopamine, across a small
gap. Following this release, the neurotransmitters can bind to receptors
on the second neuron. If sufficient neurotransmitters bind to the next
neuron in the chain, the following neuron becomes excited and propa-

4. A number of excellent introductions to neuroscience are available. For instance, see
Richard Restak, Foreword to MICHAEL S. SWEENEY, BRAIN: THE COMPLETE MIND (2009).
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gates the impulse. A single neuron may make thousands of connections
via synaptic junctions to other neurons, and it is estimated that there
are between one hundred trillion to one quadrillion such connections in
a brain. Adding further to the complexity is that there are at least
fifteen to twenty distinct neurotransmitters-for example, dopamine,
acetylcholine, glutamate, GABA, serotonin, and perhaps fifty neuroactive
peptides-and that each neurotransmitter may act via a dozen or more
different receptors unique to that neurotransmitter.
Thus, the possibilities for distinct pathways involving combinations of
multiple neurotransmitters, receptors, and regions of the brain are very,
very large, and it begs the question: Is any "explanation" of a complex
human emotion or behavior based on neuroscience necessarily overly
simplified? Is any attempt to achieve a complete neuroscientific
explanation of human emotion and behavior ultimately intractable-intellectually conceivable but practically impossible?
Leaving aside the question of tractability in "explaining" human
emotion and behavior, two developmental aspects in the maturation of
the human brain have important legal implications. Noted above, there
are one hundred billion neurons in the adult brain, but there are
possibly twice that number in the immature human brain. Through a
process known as apoptosis, or programmed cell death, the brain
removes, or prunes, many neurons late in adolescence. In addition, the
process of myelination, which speeds the conduction of nervous signals,
is not complete for several decades of life. These key developmental
steps have implications for the legal system, as the brains of children
and adolescents are not merely smaller versions of an adult brain. The
brains of children are, in fact, neurophysiologically different, both
qualitatively and quantitatively, from adult brains, and they do not
assume adult capacities until late in adolescence or early adulthood.
Legal cases that hold juveniles less responsible than their adult
counterparts take cognizance of these differencess.
An interesting possible challenge to prevailing neuroanatomic
models-the simplest localization models-comes from reports made
around 1980 showing the brain scans of individuals who were apparently
bright and functioning at a high level, despite having only a thin rim of
cortex.' Perhaps the basic neuroanatomic topology had been preserved,
as the brain retains enormous plasticity early in life, but this, to the best
of the Author's knowledge, has not been demonstrated.

5. Roger Lewin, Is Your Brain Really Necessary?, 210 SCIENCE 1232 (1980); John
Lorber, Is Your Brain Really Necessary?, 152 NURsING MIRROR 29 (1981).
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This brief introduction to neuroscience is offered primarily to provide
a background for further discussion. Let us turn now to how neuropsychiatry has fared in the courtroom.
IV. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON NEUROPSYCHIATRY IN THE
COURTROOM
While neuropsychiatry can trace its roots back several millennia, a
more useful and relevant place to begin is at the end of the eighteenth
century when the Viennese neurologist Franz Josef Gall published his
first work on phrenology.' This was at a time prior to X-rays, EEGs, or
any other modern tools that could be used to explore the relationships
between the brain and mental functioning, and relationships between
brain structure and function had to be deduced from anatomic data
derived from autopsies and gross external evidence of brain injury.
From such limited data, the theory of phrenology arose with two key
ideas. First, the surface of the brain is divided into areas corresponding
to certain functions, for example, callousness or combativeness, and
second, the development of these areas is reflected in the shape of the
skull over respective areas. Thus, a bump or enlargement in the skull
over the area associated with appetite might be associated with a
tendency toward gluttony, and a "brain scan" attempting to discern the
relative development of underlying areas could be performed by passing
the hands over the skull to feel for bumps or depressions. Despite the
lack of scientific basis for the technique, the lack of scientific associations between brain regions and functions such as acquisitiveness and
secretiveness, and the lack of acceptance of phrenology among most
physicians, phrenology was still embraced by enough of the public to
make publications popular and profitable.
The first attempt to introduce testimony involving phrenological
evidence occurred in 1834 when Major Mitchell, a nine-year-old boy, was
arrested for the beating and partial castration of an eight-year-old
schoolmate. Mitchell had suffered a head injury at an age of one week,
and his subsequent behavior was attributed to this; thus, two phrenologists examined him. Mitchell, who had already pleaded guilty, sought
to introduce testimony based on phrenological findings, particularly on
the development of areas associated with combativeness and secretiveness.' After hearing what the experts (one of whom stated he was not

6. See Donald Simpson, Phrenologyand the Neurosciences: Contributionsof F.J. Gall
and J.G. Spurzheim, 75. ANz J. SURGERY 475, 475 (2005).

7.

Kenneth J. Weiss, Isaac Ray at 200: Phrenology and Expert Testimony, 35 J. AM.

ACAD. PSYCmiATRY L. 339, 340-41 (2007).
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an expert) might testify to, the judge ruled against the introduction of

phrenological findings and conclusions:
But it is said, that the head has a large peculiar formation called the
organ of destructiveness. There is no disposition to keep out of Courts
of Justice true science, but on the contrary to pay a marked deference.
If a question were raised here, as to a fact committed in the East
Indies, and by two persons it should be said to have been full moon at
the time; and Astronomers should be called, who should demonstrate
from calculations, that there could not have been full moon at the time,
it would be proper evidence for a jury. So if dyers be called, as to the
effects of chemical combinations upon colors; or if Physicians be called
to show the effects of poison upon the human frame, such is competent
testimony. But, what it shall have been demonstrated by proof like
this, that a bump here or a bump there shall affect the mind, either to
destroy the powers of mind, or decidedly to alter its character, then,
and not till then, will such become proper evidence to be submitted to
a jury. Where people do not speak from knowledge, we cannot suffer a
mere theory to go as evidence to a jury; especially where one says he is
a believer in the system, and has no personal knowledge upon the
subject. Our decisions are made in the daylight, and the jury are
judges, of law as well as of facts.'

Mitchell was convicted and served nine years of hard labor. This case
is said to be the first introduction of psychiatric testimony in an
American courtroom.9
An important case in neuropsychiatry relating brain injury to mental
disorder was that of Phineas Gage who, in 1848, while laying a rail line,
had a tamping rod ignite a charge of gunpowder, driving the rod through
his forehead."o He survived, but suffered a marked personality change
This widely
from responsible foreman to irresponsible drunkard."
cited case reinforced the idea among nineteenth century physicians that
damage to certain portions of the brain could be associated with specific
changes in mental functioning.
The next important figure in our survey is Cesare Lombroso, who lived
from 1835 to 1909. Lombroso was an Italian psychiatrist, professor of

8. Id. at 342-43.
9. Id.
10. John M. Harlow, Passage of an Iron Rod Through the Head, 39 BOSTON MED. &
SURG. J. 389, 389 (1848).

11. See generally John M. Harlow, Recovery from the Passageof an Iron Bar Through
the Head, 2 BULL. MASS. MED. SOc'Y 327-47 (1868) reprinted in HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY
274-81 (1993).
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criminal anthropology, and is often considered the father of criminology.1 He noticed in the skull of a murderer an anomalous depression
characteristic of lower species, such as dogs. This came in an age of
Darwinism, not too long after phrenology had enjoyed public attention,
and Lombroso speculated that such a skull reflected an underlying brain
abnormality of an atavistic nature. That is, perhaps the brain of the
murderer suggested a more primitive development of a lower species.
Lombroso gathered large quantities of data from measurements on
criminals and proposed that certain criminals represented a distinct
species, homo delinquens. As his reputation grew, others also subscribed
to his theory that at least some criminals are born, not made, and
criminal types could be identified by the shapes of their skulls."
Lombroso was called upon as an expert witness on numerous occasions
to testify as to whether a defendant was of a criminal disposition. For
example, two brothers were tried for the murder of their stepmother, but
the evidence was unclear as to which was guilty of the murder.
Lombroso examined the defendants and testified that one brother clearly
had the physiognomy of "the most perfect type of the born criminal,"
and, on this evidence, that brother was convicted.' In another case,
a woman was charged with murdering several children. Although
several physicians had performed autopsies on the victims and found
their deaths to be from natural causes, Lombroso was sent a photograph
of the woman. He concluded that the woman had a criminal nature
based on her "round, small skull, flat forehead, and virile expression.""
His opinion encouraged other doctors to testify to other ways she might
have committed the murders to ensure the deaths appeared natural; she
was subsequently convicted.16
Ultimately Lombroso's theory of criminal types fell into disrepute, at
least in part because his "theory" failed an important scientific test-it
was not capable of being falsified. Those who did not have the
characteristics of born criminals were classified as "occasional criminals,"
and those who had the characteristics of criminal dispositions, but who
had not committed crimes, were simply criminals-in-waiting.

12. Edward Podolsky, Cesare Lombroso and Criminal Man, 20 MED. ANNALS DisT.
COLUMBIA 323, 323 (1951).
13. Id. at 323-25.
14. Gerald Bergman, Darwinian CriminalityTheory: A Tragic Chapterin History, 98
BioLoGY FORUMIRIVISTA DI BIOLOGIA 47, 53 (2005).
15. Rebecca B. Fleming, Scanty Goatees and Palmar Tattoos: Cesare Lombroso's
Influence on Science and PopularOpinion, 10 THE CONCORD REvIEw 195, 204 (2000).
16.

Id.
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In 1920 a physician was murdered in the District of Columbia,
resulting in a case known by most United States attorneys for its
attempted use of an early lie detection test. A man arrested for robbery
in 1921 confessed to the murder but later repudiated his confession. His
attorney, attempting to find evidence to bolster the defendant's alibi,
called a physician to administer a series of questions to the defendant
and to take his blood pressure after each question." At that time, tools
to relate brain functioning and mental processes, such as whether the
defendant was telling the truth, were limited because X-rays (discovered
in 1895) revealed little about brain functioning, EEGs were in an early
stage of development, and phrenology and Lombroso's "criminal
physiognomy" had been discredited. Nevertheless, another avenue,
involving such measurements as systolic blood pressure, was being
explored using the influence of the brain through the autonomic nervous
system. As a result, a crude lie detector test was developed based on the
assumption that the stress of lying would cause the blood pressure to
rise and would give away the liar. The physician who administered the
questions and took the blood pressures became convinced, based on the
lack of elevated blood pressure in response to questions, of the defendant's truthfulness and was prepared to testify on his behalf. At trial,
when the defense attempted to put the physician on the stand, the judge
objected, refusing to allow either the testimony or a demonstration of the
technique in front of the jury.'s In Frye v. United States," the decision to exclude testimony in the trial of James Frye was upheld by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 20 The decision might
still have saved the life of the defendant James Frye, because although
the lower court excluded the testimony, the argument regarding the
possible testimony was still heard by the jury. Subsequently the jury
convicted Frye, not of first degree murder, which would have been
subject to the death penalty, but of second degree murder.
The well-known opinion in Frye reads as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or

17. Jim Fisher, The Polygraph and the Frye Case, http/jimfisher.edinboro.edu/foren
sics/frye.html (last updated Jan. 7, 2008).
18. Id.
19. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
20. Id. at 1014.
21. Id. at 1013-14.
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discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.'
The last historical case is that of John Hinckley, who attempted to
assassinate President Reagan in 1981.' The crux of his insanity
defense was that he suffered from schizophrenia and was not criminally
responsible at the time of the shooting.' A key aspect of the case was
the introduction of a CAT scan (CT) of Hinckley's brain-the first
acceptance of a brain CT in court. The scan purported to show that
Hinckley had widened sulci-the fissures or grooves on the surface of the
brain-which, according to Dr. David Bear, was evidence for schizophrenia.2 5 Before the introduction of the CT, the government objected and
the judge, who had previously ruled the scan inadmissible, reversed
himself and ruled it admissible.26 What effect the CT had on the jury
is not entirely clear, but, given that the burden was on the prosecution
to show that Hinckley was not insane beyond a reasonable doubt,
tangible, visible evidence of mental illness, though disputed, may have
contributed to reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds.
V.

PERSONAL THOUGHTS ON NEUROPSYCHIATRY IN THE COURTROOM

For legal purposes, the Author uses only those tests upon which he
may rely clinically, for example, CT and MRI scans. CT and MRI scans
are useful in documenting brain atrophy associated with dementia, areas
of infarction due to strokes, tumors, congenital malformations, and all
gross brain defects that might account for aberrant behavior. In
addition, special MRI techniques can be useful in demonstrating
"shearing," or diffuse axonal injury due to closed head injury, in
individuals suffering sequelae from trauma to the head. The Author
does not request other scans such as fMRI, PET, or SPECT, which have
not gained wide-spread clinical acceptance for clinical or forensic use.
This is not because potential clinical applications for these scans do not
exist, but, generally, because whatever can be learned from these other

22.

Id. at 1014.

23.

RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE: THE TRIAL OF

JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. 1 (3d ed. 2008).

24. See id. at 28-31.
25. Shelley Batts, Brain Lesions and TheirImplications in CriminalResponsibility,27
BEHAV. Sci. L. 261, 262-63 (2009).
26. Stuart Taylor, CAT Scans Said to Show Shrunken Hinckley Brain, N.Y. TIMES
(June 2, 1982), www.nytimes.com/1982/06/02/us/cat-scans-said-to-sow-shrunken-hinckley
brain.html.
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scans currently can be procured more reliably and more inexpensively
with older, better established scans such as CT or MRI.
The primary reservation the Author has regarding the utility of newer
scans, clinically or forensically, is the lack of information on reliability
of results for conditions under consideration. For example, one of the
forensic considerations in deciding whether to request an fMRI to
determine if a defendant is a psychopath is the sensitivity of the test.
Out of 100 individuals with psychopathy, how often will the test be
positive or, in other words, agree with the diagnosis of psychopathy? A
sensitivity of, for example, 75% means that out of 100 individuals with
psychopathy, 25 will have a negative test, and will thus be considered
not to have psychopathy. For capital sentencing cases, is this sufficient
sensitivity?
A related question on test reliability is test specificity. Using the
example of psychopathy again, test specificity concerns how often 100
individuals who do not meet criteria for psychopathy will have an fMRI
that is read as positive for psychopathy. A test that has a specificity of
75% means that out of 100 individuals who do not have psychopathy, 25
will have a positive test, and will thus have a test result as if they were
psychopathic. The question of test specificity is probably more important
than sensitivity as it occurs very frequently in forensic settings,
especially in the prediction of dangerousness or other relatively low
probability events.
A simple calculation shows how even tests with high sensitivities and
specificities can be misleading. Assume a condition such as future
dangerousness exists in 30% of a given population, such as a population
being considered for release from prison. A test of dangerousness that
is 90% sensitive and 90% specific will yield incorrect results 10% of the
time. Among 1000 individuals tested, 300 will actually be at risk for
future dangerousness (our assumption). Of these 300, a test for
dangerousness that is 90% sensitive will miss 10%, or 30 out of 300
individuals. Among the 700 non-dangerous individuals, 10%, or 70 out
of 700, will be classified as dangerous. Is a total error of 10% (30 plus
70 out of 1000) acceptable? Since most tests have lower sensitivity and
specificity rates, higher rates of misclassification will occur. Thus, for
a condition present in 10% of individuals, and a test that has sensitivity
and specificity of 80%, 20% of persons tested will be misclassified.
An example of a potential application of fMRI is the detection of lying.
A recent study on the sensitivity and specificity associated with the use
of fMRI for this purpose found a sensitivity of 100%-all subjects who
committed a mock crime but were instructed to lie were detected by
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fMRI. 27 Unfortunately, 5 of 15 subjects who did not commit the mock
crime were found by fMRI also to be lying, a specificity of 67%.28 Onethird of "nonoffenders" in this study were classified as liars and might
have been convicted had the test results been introduced in court.
Consistent with these data, in 2007, Paul Appelbaum concluded that
neither brain-wave analysis nor fMRI data showed sufficient reliability
in truth detection to be permitted in court.29
Many of the test scans that might be considered here-fMRI, PET,
SPECT, EEG, and so forth-have unpublished sensitivity and specificity
rates for clinical conditions under consideration by the court, which
include psychopathy and schizophrenia. This by itself should be a cause
for concern-a concern reinforced by medical literature. A search of the
National Library of Medicine database PubMed,ao using the terms
"ventrolateral cortex," chosen because it is often associated with
psychopathy by experts, results in 1771 citations. Multiple nonpsychopathic conditions are reported as showing altered activity, using a
variety of techniques, in the ventrolateral area-depression, schizophrenia, ADHD, bipolar disorder, and many others-raising the question
about the specificity of altered function in the ventrolateral cortex as a
test for a single condition such as psychopathy. Similarly, a search
using the terms "dorsomedial cortex" results in 1170 citations reporting
altered activity for many of the same conditions. What are we to make
of this when confronted with testimony that a certain condition is
associated with increased activity in some cortical area? It is likely the
same finding has been reported for other conditions, so that, for example,
a psychopath with a history of fighting, substance abuse, and other
personality disorders might have fMRI or PET results "explainable" not
only by psychopathy, but, alternatively, by a condition associated with
a lifetime of violence and unlawful conduct.
An ideal test will have 100% sensitivity (all psychopaths have positive
scans) and 100% specificity (no nonpsychopaths will have a positive
scan), and under research conditions, some tests for certain conditions
have sensitivities approaching 100%.31 A question for courts is what

27. F. Andrew Kozel et al., FunctionalMRI Detection of DeceptionAfter Committing a
Mock Sabotage Crime, 54 J. FORENSIC Sci. 220-31 (2009).
28. Id. at 226.
29. Paul S. Appelbaum, The New Lie Detectors: Neuroscience, Deception, and the
Courts, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERvs. 460, 462 (2007).
30. PUBMED, http:/Incbi.nih.gov/pubmed (last visted Feb. 5, 2011).
31. For example, Ardekani et al. report a sensitivity of 96% and specificity of 92% in
differentiating patients with schizophrenia from normal controls using a variant MRI
technique. But how often is this the question in clinical or forensic settings? Most often,
"controls" are not "normal," but have a variety of other conditions such as a history of
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levels of sensitivity and specificity are acceptable under a given set of
circumstances? Have sensitivities and specificities been published for
the condition underconsideration,whether it be psychopathy, paraphilia,
or truth detection? Does civil litigation-with its lower burden of proof
but potentially great economic consequences-accept lower test sensitivities and specificities than a criminal trial?
Despite the lack of data on reliability, of 89 published opinions
involving a decision on the admissibility of PET or SPECT evidence, the
evidence was admitted 82% of the time, and 95.7% of the time, in a
bench trial.32 What is sorely needed before newer neuropsychiatric
tools can be used for clinical diagnosis and prognosis is sufficient data
from well-designed studies in which the test characteristics, including
sensitivity and specificity, can be discussed with greater certainty. It is
the Author's hope that multi-center trials using similar approaches to
diagnosis and blinded readings of results will provide such information.
Only then can we consider introducing the results of such tools into the
courtroom with confidence.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

What can we learn from this all-too-brief survey on the use of physical
tools and techniques to relate brain anatomy and function to mental
processes? First, there has been a healthy skepticism from the courts
towards the admissibility of such evidence-from phrenology through
brain scans-at least insofar as the results from these techniques purport
to help the courts gain a better understanding of such complex issues as
responsibility and morality. Second, the search for such understanding
is worthwhile. One might compare this search for objective tests of
complex human characteristics with the alchemists' search for the
philosopher's stone, which could turn base metals such as lead into gold.
And recall that while the alchemists' search was unsuccessful, pursuit
of the philosopher's stone led to the discovery of modern chemistry.
Perhaps the new search, for a philosopher's scan, even if reduction of
constructs such as free will and consciousness to neural functioning
proves intractable, will lead us to a better understanding of who we are.

substance abuse, mood disorder, or another potentially confounding condition. Babak A.
Ardekani et al., Diffusion Tensor Imaging ReliablyDifferentiatesPatientswith Schizophrenia from Healthy Volunteers, 32 HUMAN BRAIN MAPP 1, 1 (2010), available at httpJ/online
library.wiley.com/doi/10. 1002/htm.20995/pdf.
32. Neal Feigenson, BrainImaging and Courtroom Evidence: On the Admissibility and
PersuasivenessoffMRI, in LAW, MIND AND BRAIN 23, 28-29 (Michael Freeman & Oliver R.
Goodenough eds., 2009).

